

REPORT FROM GREECE

Under the Junta

NICHOLAS GAGE and ELIAS KULUKUNDIS

The hold of Greece's military dictatorship on the average Greek citizen might be compared to the effect of a choke collar on a dog. The colonels hold the leash carefully—the repression, the controls are there—but the leash is so long that it is not felt until someone forgets and steps too far, and is brought to the realization that the initiative for his actions is not his own.

The regime has an unusually good sense of when to pull and when to give rein. At the funeral of the late Premier George Papandreou, the junta did not use its full police power to scatter the huge crowd that had gathered. Had it done so, it probably would have caused further demonstrations that would have been hard to put down. But when some newspapers tried a little criticism of the regime after direct censorship was lifted recently, the colonels made sure the papers never reached the countryside.

The colonels have gone to great lengths to make it clear that they will not tolerate open opposition to their rule, but they have been careful not to make such lessons so painful or so dramatic that they incite even greater opposition. In a number of areas in the provinces, people have been

arrested for insulting a representative of the regime, condemning the coup or other such offenses. But they have been held only briefly and then released. In one village in the northwest corner of the country, for example, a merchant was arrested for calling the new junta-appointed monarch of the province a thief, in the heat of a debate with fellow villagers. He was arrested, imprisoned for a month and then tried and acquitted. The purpose of such arrests is to cut off open criticism by making the threat of imprisonment real in every village. People are made an example of, and then freed to create the impression that the regime is not arbitrary and oppressive but capable of compassion and even justice. These arrests are also used by the colonels to dramatize the difference between them and the Communists. In many of the same villages during the Greek civil war of 1946-49, Communist guerrillas executed as many as a dozen people for criticizing them or their methods. (All told 57,383 Greek civilians were killed by the guerrillas and 684,607 driven from their homes.) In the village where the merchant was arrested, the Communists in 1948 publicly executed five persons, including two women, and piled their bodies in a gully. In comparison, the junta's treatment of the merchant did not seem oppressive to his fellow villagers, but rather restrained. One said, "I would rather have the junta for a hundred years than to have those bastards back for one day." Knowing the depth of such feelings, the colonels still maintain in the villages that their intervention on April 21, 1967, kept Greece from falling to the Communists, although in the cities they find it hard to

✪ NICHOLAS GAGE is a journalist whose work has appeared in the *New York Times Magazine*, the *Atlantic* and the *New Leader*. He was born in Greece, but he is an American citizen and was educated here. He is currently writing a book on Greece. ELIAS KULUKUNDIS, an American citizen, currently resides in London. His father-in-law, George Mylonas, was minister of education in the Papandreou government. Mr. Kulukundis is the author of *The Feasts of Memory*.

justify such a line, and now say that they saved the country from political chaos.

It is in the villages of Greece that the junta enjoys its strongest public support, and for good reasons. The governments that ran Greece before the coup concentrated on developing and expanding the cities, neglecting the villages on the theory that most Greeks were leaving them for metropolitan areas anyway. The junta has gone to some pains to redress this imbalance. It increased pensions for agricultural workers, which were the lowest in Greece. It cancelled the outstanding loans of all farmers, a move highly criticized by economists but roundly applauded in the countryside. It accelerated programs of electrification and road construction. Plans are underway, for instance, to build the longest highway in Greece across the rural northern section of the country. The highway will stretch from Igoumenitsa on the Ionian Sea to the Turkish border in Thrace. Economists have argued that there is not enough movement in this area to justify the \$150 million that will be spent on the road, but the junta seems determined to go ahead with the project.

There is another, perhaps equally significant, reason the colonels are strongly supported in the villages. They were born and brought up in isolated villages and the puritanical measures they have tried to enforce throughout Greece epitomize the values of such villages. The colonels may seem old-fashioned and foolish to urban Greeks when they are expounding on such evils as miniskirts and beards or such virtues as church attendance every Sunday, but they appear strong and wise to rural Greeks. "The closest analogy to the kind of people the colonels come from is the poor whites in America who support George Wallace," says an American educator who has lived in Greece for many years. Premier Papadopoulos, who grew up in a small Peloponnesian village which now has a population of 280 people, is considered upper-class by the other officers who staged the coup because his father was the village schoolteacher. Stylianos Patakos, the deputy premier, is from the

tiny (population 154) Cretan village of Aghia Paraskevi, and Nikolaos Makarezos, the minister of coordination, comes from a village in the Peloponnesus called Gravia, which has a comparatively large population of 613 people. In such villages women do not smoke, wear makeup or speak to a man who is not a close relative except to say good morning or good evening. The colonels still hold tightly to many of the values they knew in such villages, and Greeks still living in the countryside admire them for it.

Despite attitudes in the rural areas, however, the regime is strongly opposed by large numbers of Greeks in the cities and on the islands. It is in the cities that the damage done by the colonels has been felt most. Greeks in Athens and other cities were moving rapidly toward a European life-style and standard of living. But the colonels have slowed the movement down and in some cases stopped it altogether. The slowdown of the economy and the drop in tourism that followed their arrival has lowered the incomes of many Greeks by as much as thirty percent. In addition, thousands of people have been dismissed from their jobs because they were considered unfriendly to the regime.

The regime's harassment of artists and writers has stunted cultural life in the country and aroused a great deal of controversy. Almost all of the plays produced in Athens last season were revivals or imports and there have not been any significant books published in Greece since the colonels seized power. Because of the reputation of the junta abroad, there has been little cultural communication with the rest of Europe. The Athens Festival, which has featured some of the best performers in the world in past summers, did not boast one major name last year. Aristotle Onassis tried to persuade Margot Fonteyn and Rudolf Nureyev to perform at the festival, and their appearance was widely publicized in advance, but they thought it over and declined.

Continued censorship of the press in Greece constantly frustrates this nation of insatiable newspaper readers. "The newspapers were hardly objective before

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the coup," says a hotel manager in Rhodes, "but at least you had the freedom to choose what lies you read. Now it is all one lie." Circulation of Greek newspapers is at sixty percent of the level before the coup. Six papers stopped publishing after the takeover; the crypto-Communist ones were banned and the publishers of the others refused to publish under censorship.

On October 3, 1969, the junta announced with great fanfare that it was lifting press censorship. At the same time, however, it handed editors a long list of forbidden subjects that in effect kept press control almost as tight as before. The regime has published a code of 101 articles designed to "cleanse" the press. Stories that the junta feels undermine public confidence in the economy could bring six months imprisonment under the code. Editors convicted of inciting sedition, as the junta sees it, could get life. When the code was announced, Mr. Patakos offered the junta's philosophical reasoning for making it so harsh. "Severity," he said, "is the mother of justice and freedom."

When censorship was in force, even papers supporting the regime had to follow the censor's commands, as we witnessed one night while visiting the offices of *Eleftheros Kosmos*. It was December 29, 1968, the day Israel retaliated to an Arab terrorists' attack on an El Al jet in Athens airport by launching a helicopter raid on an airport in Beirut. We were sitting with one of the paper's editors when his assistant came into the office carrying a piece of paper with a list of shorthand messages on it. "The Censor's office just called," he said. "You want to go through it now?"

"Yes, all right," said the editor. "What is it tonight?"

The assistant said the paper was instructed not to print in any form the New Year's message King Constantine had issued from exile in Rome, but to give prominent display on the front page to the regent's message, and it was not to mention the statement of former foreign minister Evangelos Averoff calling on the government to move toward parliamentary rule. Then he looked from his

list and said: "The big thing is about the attack in Beirut. The censor said we must not mention that it was in retaliation for the attack at our airport."

"There must be some mistake," the editor said. "We can't run a story about an attack and not give the reason for it. He must mean they don't want us to emphasize the shooting at our airport. Call him back and ask him to repeat the instructions, please." The assistant left the room and returned a few minutes later. "I had it right the first time, and he wasn't too happy I called back," he said. "As far as we are concerned there has never been an attack of any kind at our airport. For tonight we should just forget we have an airport."

We asked the editor how he felt working under such conditions. "What can you do?" he said. "The only option you have is not to work at all. It is not much of an option."

Perhaps the most destructive intervention of the regime has been in education. The Greek educational system was anachronistic and inadequate to begin with, but the colonels have pushed it even further into the tunnel. "Young People of Greece, the Revolution Is for You" proclaim signs on highways leading out of Athens. But in its educational policy the regime seems primarily interested in making certain that the young people of Greece are for the revolution. Hundreds of teachers and professors considered unfriendly to the regime have been dismissed. All the others have been required to submit detailed histories, especially on what they were doing during the period of the civil war, and a statement of political beliefs. In public schools the indoctrination of students is a part of the curriculum. In the lower grades, for example, students are asked to rise and repeat slogans such as, "My mother is Greece. My father is the national government. And I am the Greek people." The climate of chauvinism in Greek schools, which has always been heavy, is now more intense than ever. "The children of this country are sick and tired of being taught that Greece is the navel of the world," says an

American educator who teaches in a private school in Athens. "*Patrida* [fatherland] should never become a dirty word, but it is with students now."

In the universities the *asphalia*, the security police, has built up a network of informers to report on the activities and attitudes of fellow students. Early last summer the regime also appointed a government commissioner for every faculty. The job of the commissioners, mostly retired army officers, is to see that teaching programs are in line with the goals of the junta. To keep tight control of the teaching staffs at universities, the regime has not only dismissed numerous professors, it has also restricted the numbers of new appointments and lowered the retirement age of teachers so that older, respected professors of independent minds can be replaced with ambitious younger ones more to the regime's liking. All this naturally has created a shortage of qualified professors and a considerable drop in the quality of instruction.

The regime's intervention has not been limited to Greek schools. Private institutions such as the American-sponsored Athens College have also been affected. Professor Costas Kalokairinos, a Greek national on the college faculty, was dismissed in March, 1969, by the then minister of education, Theophylactos Papakonstantinou. (Greek instructors at Athens College are not considered civil servants, but they are pensioned off by the government and on this ground it holds the right to fire them.) The justification for the dismissal: Papakonstantinou said a book Professor Kalokairinos had once published on Byzantine history quoted directly from the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* and contained "Communist reasoning" such as the claim that Macedonia was once a part of Bulgaria.

Many Europeans and Americans, who tend to think all Greeks are brothers to Alexis Zorba, find it hard to understand why so passionate a people have accepted dictatorship so passively. Greeks themselves give many answers. They point out that there have been some forms

of resistance. Intellectuals and professionals have refused to collaborate with the regime and they continue their boycott even though many of them have suffered for it. More active resistance is developing fast, as a rash of bombings last summer in Athens demonstrated. But full and effective resistance takes leadership, and the colonels have been careful to exile to remote villages and islands military men and political figures who might provide it. Those still around don't want to take the personal risk involved in leading a rebellion against the junta. "They want the people to throw the colonels out first," says a truck driver from Larisa, "and then call them to take over. The people are not that dumb anymore."

There are, however, more subtle reasons why resistance to the junta has been minimal. One of them may be understood quickly by a visit to Athens. The city is punctuated with the skeletons of hundreds of buildings now under construction. Every morning crowded buses roar out of Athens for the nearby beaches at Glyfada, Vouliagmeni, Varkiza and Lagonisi. The better restaurants are almost full most nights, and the hawkers of lottery tickets at Omonia Square still do a good day's business. In other words, life under the colonels may be unpleasant—particularly for students, professors, politicians, journalists and artists—but it is not so unpleasant that it's worth risking imprisonment or death to change. Incomes have fallen, but not so much that a couple can't go to a taverna once in a while. Greek newspapers are disappointing, but there are *Le Monde*, the *International Herald Tribune* and *Le Figaro* at the kiosks for those who read other languages or the Greek programs on the BBC every night for those who don't. Uncles and friends are dismissed from jobs but at least they get part of their pensions when they go. "They have not really squeezed us," a tailor in Piraeus told us. "I wouldn't cast my vote for them if I had a choice. But things are not so bad that I'd throw myself in front of a tank to get them out."

The colonels have been careful not to display their power beyond that necessary

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to keep themselves in control. There are no more soldiers in the streets of Greek cities than anywhere else in Europe, and uniformed police seem less visible now than before the coup. Although arrests continue, Greeks don't seem to concern themselves unless their own families are affected, and most are not. Of the six thousand people who were sent to prisons following the coup, more than two-thirds have been released. Most significant, the colonels have not executed anybody. "Greeks are wonderful, but when they start to kill, they can be the most terrible people in the world," Mrs. Constantine Mitsotakis, wife of the Greek politician, told us in her home last year, a few months before she was allowed to join her husband in exile in Paris. "I remember during the war when you would walk into the street and find somebody's body riddled with bullets and you didn't know whether it was the Germans, the rightists, the leftists or a jealous husband who killed him. I am terribly frightened for Greece if the killing ever starts."

Students of Greek history see a good reason for the absence of strong resistance to the junta in the fact that the country has developed during the past twenty years a significant bourgeois class. For the first half of this century Greece was involved in five wars and numerous upheavals. The only period of stability and progress came after 1950. During this time most Greeks were able to acquire something—a house, a farm, a business—for the first time in their lives, and they want to be around to enjoy it, even if it's under the colonels.

Finally, Greeks feel it's not *their* responsibility to drive out the colonels. "The Americans brought them in," a high school teacher on Corfu told us, "and the Americans can get them out." If there is one belief about the colonels that most Greeks share above all others, it is that they are in power because the United States wants them there.

Over a period of ten months we talked to several members of the United States diplomatic mission to Greece both informally and officially. The comments of

most of them are reflected in those stated in an interview we had with one of the senior men in the American embassy. The interview was held in his large, panelled office and began with a question we had asked every other member of the mission we talked with: Did the embassy know beforehand about the coup?

We had no idea at all [he said]. We thought there might be a coup from royalist generals but not from populist colonels. When it happened, everyone here flopped around in complete confusion. We didn't know what to do. The colonels, whatever else may be said about them, are very skillful conspirators. Papadopoulos, Patakos, Makarezos all served in the Greek intelligence service at one time or another and are very good at keeping secrets.

We asked if conditions in Greece prior to the coup had deteriorated to such an extent that intervention by the army was necessary. Would the elections that had been scheduled for May 28, 1967, have led to a center-left coalition that would have resulted ultimately in a Communist takeover, as the colonels claim? He answered:

The situation was bad but hardly as bad as it has been made out. The violence—demonstrations, student riots, strikes—took place mostly in 1965 when George Papandreu was pushed out as premier by King Constantine—not in the period immediately preceding the coup. George Papandreu had promised that he would not have cooperated with the Communist-front party no matter how the elections turned out. I think he would have kept his promise.

For two years before the coup you had a deteriorating political situation in Greece, but the palace is primarily responsible for that. In a parliamentary system, when you reach a political impasse as Greece did in 1965, you go to the people. The palace maneuvered for more than two years to prevent elections by promoting makeshift governments that had no basis of support. But even though the parliamentary system was not working well in Greece, there was no Communist danger. The Communist-front party, EDA, had actually declined in voting strength, and the Communists simply didn't command the means to cause any other kind of trouble. The idea that there was an imminent threat of a Communist takeover is for the birds as far as I'm concerned. In fact,

the colonels themselves have backed away from their early statements that Greece would have fallen to the Communists. Many people believed these statements largely because of Andreas Papandreou. Andreas represented a new and somewhat dangerous force in Greek politics by questioning everything that Greeks felt secure about—NATO, the close ties with the United States, a strong stand against Russia. His statements made a lot of people afraid, made them think that Greece was heading toward Communism or chaos as long as he had any access to power.

We then asked what the attitude of the American mission was toward the colonels. He said:

Well, there is a split in the mission. The military advisers think very well of them. As military allies they are as cooperative as one could wish. [Former Ambassador Phillips] Talbot leaned heavily on a wait-and-see policy, that we should give them time to show their intentions. I think they have done that. I think they have no intention at all of moving toward parliamentary government. Their slowness in implementing the constitution approved in a referendum in September, 1968, is a certain sign of that. I see no evidence whatsoever that they are preparing for elections. Even if Papadopoulos wanted to hold them, I don't think he would be allowed to do it.

The Revolutionary Council, which is made up of some thirty key military officers and is the primary policy-making group in the government, has made known its opposition to elections. Elections, no matter what their outcome, would carry the seeds of the colonels' removal from power. Elections would lead to more criticism, more demands for change. And I don't think the colonels believe their own propaganda that the bulk of the Greek people are with them. They're too smart for that.

We asked if the United States could pressure the colonels to hold elections. He said:

No, we could push them out if we tried hard enough, but we don't force them toward elections. They'll just say no and we'll either have to accept that or try to push them out. Let me hasten to add here that I don't see us pushing them out.

We asked why.

It's hard to prove that the people of Greece are that unhappy over them or that oppressed

by them [he said]. The colonels have not been that oppressive as far as dictators go. They have not executed anybody. The number of political prisoners is small and most of them come out if they sign a pledge that they won't engage in political activity. People are not exactly dropping dead on the streets from starvation or wasting away in concentration camps. A large number of Greeks, probably the majority, may not be happy about the junta, but they are not very active in showing their discomfort. So I don't see Washington taking any strong action against the junta until the problem becomes acute.

(What bothers opponents of the junta is not only that the United States is not doing anything against the junta but that it seems to be doing a lot for it. For example, Washington actively tried to persuade the members of the Council of Europe not to expel Greece. "The American government is always sending someone to decorate or to be decorated by the colonels," says Helen Vlachos, the exiled publisher, who refused to publish her papers under dictatorship. "Ambassador Talbot was always trying to persuade me to start up my papers. 'Oh, come on now,' he would say, 'these guys are not so bad.'")

We asked the American diplomat in Athens how the United States could bring down the colonels if it wanted to. He answered:

There are several ways. If Washington decided that this regime is bad for Greece, bad for the NATO alliance, bad for this section of the world, and said so publicly, I think the junta would topple. Also if the Administration contacted Constantine Karamanlis, the former premier to whom most people hopeful of a return to parliamentary government are looking, invited him to Washington and indicated American support for him, elements in the armed forces would push the colonels out and invite Karamanlis back.

We asked if he saw any chance of that happening.

Right now none at all [he said]. What I do see is the colonels going on for a long time, probably getting tougher as they go. There are some very hard-liners in the army making their influence felt right now. If the regime gets tougher, resistance will develop. pushing the

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colonels to harsher measures, which will in turn stimulate stronger and wider resistance. Then, I think, Washington might take some definite action.

If that is a possibility, we asked, why doesn't the United States do something now and save Greece from all that violence? He said:

That would be nice, but it's unrealistic to expect any government to be that logical. Governments are geared to respond to crises, not to anticipate them. It is difficult for a government to take preventive action in an area that involves the internal affairs of another country unless its interests are clearly and directly threatened. This is particularly true now, after Vietnam.

If Washington won't take direct action, we asked, is it at least trying to let the colonels know that it wants to see them move toward elections?

We are [he said], but they don't seem to believe us. They think we say we want elections only for public relations purposes, which is a view I find difficult in avoiding myself at times. Patakos went to Washington for Eisenhower's funeral and Secretary of State Rogers asked him when the junta planned to go to the people. Patakos said it had done so already in the constitutional referendum of 1968. Rogers told him Washington would like to see the junta move toward direct elections as soon as possible. Patakos nodded and smiled. I'm sure he didn't believe him.

Before we left, we asked him what he thought about the reports of tortures. Did he have any knowledge that the junta was torturing political prisoners? "We don't know for certain," he said. "They seem to get a lot of information fast from people they arrest, which leads us to believe that prisoners are beaten. Greek police have a reputation for beating prisoners. But we are not absolutely sure of anything. We just don't know."

Torture has been the *bête noire* of the Greek government, and, although it was not on the agenda when the ministers of the Council of Europe met in December, the rash of unfavorable publicity probably enabled the plaintiff governments to rally the votes necessary for Greece's expulsion.

(At the last moment, as a face-saving measure, Greece voluntarily withdrew.)

The government's troubles began in January, 1968, when two lawyers, James Becket and Anthony Marreco, went to Athens to conduct an investigation on behalf of Amnesty International, and returned to write two reports describing the practice of torture by the Greek security police. Later, as a result of charges brought by the three Scandinavian governments, the European Human Rights Commission took up the question and completed a report which found that the Greek government was practicing torture as a matter of policy.

The great majority of Commission witnesses said they were tortured by *falanga*, an ancient practice originated under the Ottoman Empire and employed by both sides in the Greek civil war. (In some instances, men and women reported sexual tortures, and some dozen witnesses said they were tortured by electric shocks.) The victim of *falanga* is usually strapped to a bench or a flat surface and beaten on the soles of his shoes with a club or an iron bar. "After a dozen blows you don't know where the pain is coming from," one person explained. "You think they are hitting you on the top of the head." After twenty or thirty blows, the victim usually loses consciousness, to be revived with cold water so that the beating can be carried on. At regular intervals, he is made to stand, walk, or even jump to revive the circulation in his feet and thus to maximize the pain. Since the victim has his shoes on, the beating leaves no scars, and although the pain may be unbearable at the time, he may be able to walk as early as ten days later. Some persons have said that they were subjected to *falanga* several times during interrogation periods that have lasted as long as forty days.

The Greek government rejected the charges of torture as lies and Communist propaganda, making much of the lack of physical evidence for such charges. In some cases it has employed the Soviet ploy of claiming that the witnesses are mentally deranged. In November, 1968, it brought three witnesses to Strasbourg

to testify that they had been in the Security Police Headquarters and had not been tortured, but two of them defected to the opposition and testified that they had been, after all. (Then one of them disappeared under mysterious circumstances to reappear in the Greek Embassy in Stockholm where he repudiated his testimony a second time before returning to Greece.)

In addition, the government has made a more subtle attempt to defend itself by appealing to the authority of no less prestigious an organization than the International Red Cross. Since May, 1967, the Red Cross has made repeated visits to Greece, mostly to island detention camps, prisons and prison hospitals.

Under the terms of the Geneva Conventions, which apply not only to Greece but to any signatory, the Red Cross must make its reports available to the host government and may not publish them unless the government does so first. To date, the Greek government has chosen to publish only two of four general reports, both following Red Cross protests against its attempts to quote from the reports in a tendentious and misleading manner. In one case, Foreign Minister Panayiotis Pipinellis said that the Red Cross delegate had utterly repudiated the charges of torture, an allegation that was proved false when the published report revealed that the delegate had not mentioned the subject at all.

In fact, there are only six pages in one of the published reports that deal with torture. They concern the visit in March, 1968, of the Red Cross delegate, Laurent Marti, to the Security Police Headquarters in Bouboulina Street where much of the torture has allegedly taken place. Mr. Marti (who was recently replaced as the Red Cross representative in Athens) requested permission for this visit in advance, and since he does not speak Greek, he was accompanied by an interpreter who was a permanent employee of the Greek Red Cross. When he arrived, he found only two detainees in the Security Headquarters and, in the presence of the interpreter, both of them told him that

they "did not know if torture was being carried on there." In addition, Mr. Marti says that the chief of police "was able to affirm that no ill-treatment or torture was inflicted on the prisoners." He also mentions that three detainees interviewed after they had been transferred from Bouboulina Street were able to show wounds "which they said they had suffered in the course of torture," but he does not say where these wounds were located or what they looked like. He says ten detainees said they had been given *falanga* once, twelve said they had been given it more than once, twenty-four said they had been punched with fists, and eighty-five said they had been well-treated. Finally, the conclusion he draws from this evidence is a syntactic and semantic labyrinth: "The I.C.R.C. limits itself to reporting these contradictory declarations from which it does not feel it has to draw conclusions about the reality of the alleged tortures."

Quotations from this report became the substance of a government pamphlet entitled "The Truth About Greece," hailed as a "smashing reply" to the allegations of torture. The pamphlet was withdrawn following vigorous Red Cross protests, but criticism of Mr. Marti's investigation did not subside.

"The Red Cross was under pressure to investigate the torture question," says Anthony Marreco, one of the authors of the Amnesty International Report, which asserted that the Greek government was practicing torture. "But they were determined to do it without being conclusive. In other words, Mr. Marti's main concern was not to say anything that would result in his being thrown out of Greece."

On this last point, Mr. Marti readily agrees: he believes he can be most useful to the Greek political prisoners if he is allowed to visit them, instead of being barred from the country as Marreco was. Like Mr. Marti, Red Cross officials define their role precisely as that of a relief organization, and they point with pride to their success in convincing the government to close the detention camp on the island of Yaros and to release some aged

and infirm prisoners. Here too they have had their failures, for the government will not usually respond unless continually prodded. For example, in March, 1969, Mr. Marti complained to the government of the overcrowded condition of one of the detention camps on Leros, where people were reported to be sleeping in corridors, and the Red Cross later suggested that the government release the more aged and infirm prisoners to improve the general morale. Mr. Marti has made at least four visits to Greece since that time, but it was not until December that he was reported to have returned to Leros to see if these suggestions were carried out. Since the report on this visit will probably not be published, any further pressure on the government will again be up to Mr. Marti.

As for the torture issue, Mr. Marti explained his criteria in an interview during one of his recent trips. He is a well-tailored Swiss with an oval face and receding hair. He showed us to the terrace of his office, which offers a beautiful view of the Acropolis.

You cannot imagine what we hear from former prisoners [he said]. But we cannot go by what we hear, only what we see. Journalists can print stories of former prisoners who say they have been tortured and let their readers judge if they are true. I cannot make judgments. I must say only what I see. I must see evidence in the prisons or on the prisoners. That is the only evidence I can accept.

We asked Mr. Marti if he had seen evidence of torture on the prisoners. He said:

That's confidential. But I can tell you that you cannot get much evidence unless you have free access to every police station in the country, because it is at the stations where the beatings are likely to take place. By the time people get to the prisons, it is too late . . . Besides, the problem here is not a problem of torture. It is different and worse . . . When a government wants everyone in the country to think as it thinks, to believe what it believes, to follow to the letter what it commands, then you have pure Fascism. That is the problem here. It is not a problem of beatings. All the hue and cry about the tortures draws attention away from

the real problems of Greece—press censorship, no elections, suspension of civil liberties. It would be much better if people on the outside stopped shouting "Stop the tortures" and started shouting "Start the elections."

But despite Mr. Marti's political indictment of the Greek government, many critics believe he has given it ample room for maneuver in the torture question. For example, one of his subordinates has seen the physical evidence of torture and reported it to his superiors. After a visit to a detention camp in the summer of 1968, a Red Cross doctor reported that in unusual instances "certain . . . detainees were able to show us the physical evidence of torture," and he suggested that the Red Cross urge the Greek government to stop all forms of torture. People who have seen both the published and the unpublished reports say that Mr. Marti has not included this mention of torture, a fact that would support his critics' most serious charge: that he has his evidence but is not using it.

"No one will show Mr. Marti a man in the process of being tortured," says Ole Espersen, the assistant Danish agent before the Human Rights Commission. "But he has seen prisoners with the marks of torture on them. Now why doesn't he put that in his reports? The Greek government could suppress the report if it wanted to, but the Red Cross has the responsibility to report the facts or not make any report at all."

Partly as a result of such criticism, the Red Cross has recently adopted a more activist interpretation of its powers. According to a source close to Red Cross circles, one official recently described it as an attempt "to obtain increased freedom and to use it . . . to make tests, see the response, and on the basis of those tests, either continue our work or discontinue it." In keeping with this policy, the Red Cross successfully pressured the government to sign an agreement providing for a degree of intervention usually unacceptable to a nation in peacetime. In June, 1969, a Red Cross official presented it to Premier Papadopoulos, and on November 3, with just over a month to go

before the meeting of the Council of Europe Ministers, Papadopoulos signed.

Under the terms of the agreement, the Red Cross is granted the right to visit any detention center, whether civilian or military, and to demand to see any political prisoner. After every visit, the Red Cross will issue a communiqué announcing the dates, places and conditions of its visits. Lest anyone miss the point of this last provision, the agreement specifically prohibits the government from misrepresenting the reports in any way. As a result of these increased activities, the Red Cross announced that it is establishing a permanent mission to Greece, to be housed in quarters separate from the local Red Cross chapter.

The Red Cross clearly won the first round, and the victory belongs to those officials who have long been arguing that the Greek government would submit to a more activist policy. Even so, the Red Cross has still not attempted to assert the full measure of freedom that officials believe is necessary to make a thorough investigation of the torture question. According to informed sources, these officials believe the new agreement can be fully effective only if the delegate asserts his right to make his visits without serving notice ahead of time. Nothing is stipulated to require the delegate to announce his visits, but for some reason Mr. Marti has always done so.

"You may wonder why we let them know [we are coming]," he told us last July. "Because it gives them time to fix things up. I say fine to that: let them fix things up. That is our job, to improve conditions for political prisoners. If they improve them because they know we are coming, that's fine."

On this issue, Mr. Marti has found himself at odds with the new policy, which obviously presupposes a much wider conception of the way to improve conditions. Informed sources say that after the agreement was signed, Mr. Marti was instructed to conduct his visits without serving notice, but nevertheless he continued to submit written requests to the foreign ministry in his accustomed manner. In the words

of one source, "there was a misunderstanding . . . there were delays," but finally a decision was taken by the Committee itself that makes it a matter of policy for the delegate to make his visits "on the shortest possible notice."

Greeks call the chauvinistic, puritanical and single-minded men who command power in Greece today *stenokephaloi*, narrow-heads. But in some ways, the king and the politicians who ruled before them could have used some of their ability to bury their differences and focus on priorities. In April, 1967, Greece had the highest per capita income of any country to have suffered a coup, well over double the average. Nevertheless, the intrigues of the palace as well as of the politicians had contributed to a state of uncertainty that left the country defenseless, ripe for a military takeover.

Constantine Karamanlis and several of his ministers believe that if King Paul had not pushed their government out of power in 1963, it would still be serving today and there would be no colonels. Andreas Papandreu and former ministers of the Center Union party claim that if King Paul's successor, Constantine, had not done the same thing to George Papandreu in 1965, the Center Union would still be in power and again there would be no colonels.

"From 1946 onwards, the king ruled with complete authority over the armed forces," says Constantine Mitsotakis. "And he intended to keep his powers. The first victim of this system was Karamanlis. The second was Papandreu."

The monarchy has never had solid roots in Greece. It dates from 1830 when Greece drove out the Turks after four hundred years of occupation only to become a protectorate of the European powers, which promptly installed an adolescent and ineffectual Bavarian prince named Otto as ruler. Since there is no hereditary aristocracy in Greece, the monarchy has no natural allies among the people and has used the armed forces to safeguard its position. With the support of the military behind them,

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Greek kings seldom paid much attention to public opinion.

In 1963, Karamanlis advised King Paul to cancel a state visit to London, because he anticipated demonstrations by the British Communists. King Paul ignored his advice, forcing the issue to a crisis which ended with Karamanlis' resignation. According to one of his former ministers, the king had been looking for a reason to push him out of power. "On one side he felt threatened by Karamanlis," the minister said, "because he had been making increasing demands on the palace to loosen its hold on the armed forces. And on the other he saw that public support for the monarchy was falling rapidly. Aware that the public had also grown disenchanted with Karamanlis, he used the London visit to force his resignation and bolster the monarchy."

A tough, able leader, Karamanlis had done much to build up the country since taking office in 1955. By 1960 the economy was growing annually at a rate of almost eight percent and some \$100 million in foreign investments were pouring in annually. In his zeal to build up a strong economy, Karamanlis had neglected education and social services, and his government was repeatedly accused of strong-arm methods, particularly in the rural areas. But Karamanlis claims there was an overall strategy in his methods.

"You think I don't care about people?" Karamanlis asked a visitor to his home in Paris last year. "I care very much. But I knew that the most important thing for Greece after the wars and all the devastation was to build her up. To do that sacrifices had to be made. What good is it to turn out one thousand engineers a year if there are no jobs to put them in? I did what was best for Greece . . . During the eight years of my administration, we built a strong economic foundation that would have had Greece on the level of Italy by now if my policies had been followed."

In the elections of 1961, Karamanlis' party, the National Radical Union (ERE), had been strongly challenged by

the Center Union, a coalition of splinter parties led by George Papandreou. In fact, the Center Union claimed that the winning margin had been the result of coercion and fraud in the rural areas, where the army gendarmerie had considerable arbitrary authority. (When the Center Union finally came to power in 1963, it discovered a so-called "Plan Pericles" which the ERE had left behind in army dossiers. It provided some evidence for the claim.)

Having learned a lesson from his narrow margin of victory, Karamanlis was apparently planning to embark on an enlarged social program to woo popular support when King Paul pushed him out. "Our government was well aware that its standing with the people had deteriorated," said a former member of Karamanlis' cabinet. "The reason was our heavy emphasis on capital investment at the expense of social services. But we had a plan to do something about it. If Karamanlis had not been pressured into resigning, he would have given himself a year's leeway and during that period he would have launched a series of programs to upgrade education, increase pensions, expand public services and all the rest. Enough voters would have been won back to ensure victory for Karamanlis. But we never had the chance to use the plan."

The intervention of the monarch undoubtedly cost Karamanlis the election. When the ballots were counted in November, 1963, it became clear that Papandreou's Center Union had won by only three percent of the vote. Without a clear majority, Papandreou rejected a parliamentary coalition with the Communist-front party, the United Democratic Left (EDA), and called for new elections in February, 1964. Many Greeks tend to vote simply for the party they think is going to win, and this election was no exception: after the slim victory three months earlier, the Center Union in February won fifty-three percent of the vote—the largest plurality in postwar Greek history.

Nevertheless, according to George Pa-

pandreou's followers as well as his critics, he remained an opposition leader even after he became prime minister, and during his scant sixteen months in office, he failed to develop a clearly formulated policy.

Andreas Papandreou believes the downfall of his father's government was ensured in Washington in June, 1964, when George Papandreou refused President Johnson's request for a meeting with Turkish Premier Inonu to defuse the Cyprus crisis. But many people in the Center believe another cause of the party's downfall was Andreas himself.

Andreas Papandreou had left Greece in 1940 to study economics at Harvard University. A rapid rise in the academic world brought him to the University of California at Berkeley as a full professor in 1955. In 1961, he gave up teaching and returned to Athens at the invitation of the Karamanlis government to be director of the Center of Economic Research. Three years later, having given up his American citizenship, he ran in the elections as a deputy in his father's party.

When his father became prime minister, Andreas became his chief aide. During the same year, however, he resigned under a cloud of never-proved scandal, involving the awarding of a government contract. When his father brought him back in the powerful post of minister of coordination, a lot of people thought Papandreou was determined to make his son the future leader of the Center Union.

"Andreas wanted swift advancement," says Constantine Mitsotakis, his possible rival for the party leadership. "Twice he had to be rescued by his father from ministries where he had failed. Our party was a new party of many smaller groups with much less discipline than the ERE, and whatever balance existed between them was destroyed by Andreas. He had great influence over his father. Usually we would take one decision as a group and in the evening Andreas would go alone to his father's home at Kastri and convince him to do something else."

A number of men in the councils of the Center Union decided that the only way to prevent Andreas from taking power was to bring George Papandreou down as well. One of them was Panos Kokkas, the powerful publisher of the Athens daily *Eleftheria*, who favored replacing him with Mitsotakis. *Eleftheria* attacked Papandreou on the issue of the army, claiming that it was a party unto itself which should be made directly responsible to the elected government. But, according to Andreas Papandreou, these attacks were really a provocation, calculated to bring government into conflict with the monarchy and thus remove it from power.

Pressured by his own party and public opinion, George Papandreou started replacing rightist army officers with liberals, including those on Cyprus and other sensitive posts. General George Grivas, the rightist commander of Greek forces on Cyprus, was not happy at the influx of such officers, and after some digging, he claimed to have discovered a secret army group named ASPIDA, allegedly headed by Andreas Papandreou. Grivas took his allegations to Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias, warning that the aim of ASPIDA was to overthrow the monarchy and pull Greece out of the Atlantic Alliance. (Some twenty-eight officers were ultimately convicted of conspiracy in the ASPIDA affair, but it was never proved that their intention was to overthrow the monarchy or that Andreas Papandreou was their leader. There had been in the army a secret rightist group called IDEA, whose members determined promotions and assignments, and thus it was not strange that an opposing group of liberal officers should form an organization to counteract it. Unnoticed at the time was a third secret organization in the army, made up of rightist officers who resented IDEA's power. This group, called EENA, was headed by a then unknown colonel named George Papadopoulos.)

According to Andreas Papandreou, his father's trusted friend Garoufalias actually contributed to the misunderstanding.

ings between Papandreou and the king, hoping to be called as prime minister of an interim service government.

Another man standing in the wings was Constantine Mitsotakis, who Andreas says had promised Queen Mother Frederika that in the event of Papandreou's fall he would break with the party and bring eighty Center Union deputies with him. (Mitsotakis denies the charge and says he continually urged George Papandreou not to force a confrontation.)

When Garoufalias brought the news of ASPIDA to Constantine, the king demanded a full investigation. "I regard it as your duty to proceed at once to do what I ask," the twenty-eight-year-old monarch wrote to the seventy-seven-year-old prime minister. "This is my very last warning."

When Papandreou refused the king's request, Garoufalias promptly launched the investigation on his own. Papandreou called for Garoufalias' resignation, and, as a temporary measure until another minister could be appointed, he announced that he was taking over the defense ministry himself.

But the king refused to accept Papandreou as defense minister in his own government. Even Mitsotakis now says the king's position was indefensible. "If Papandreou was good enough to be prime minister, he was good enough to be defense minister," he says. Papandreou clearly reached the same conclusion himself. On July 15, he declared that his resignation would be effective within twenty-four hours, obviously assuming that the king would then have to call for new elections in which he could take his case to the people. The king did no such thing. He simply accepted Papandreou's resignation, effective immediately. To the amazement of everyone who was not in on the plot from the beginning, several gentlemen in frock coats—including Mitsotakis—showed up at the palace, ready to be sworn in as the new government.

The king's high-handed dismissal of Papandreou triggered events that ultimately led to the coup. "Papandreou would have collapsed on his own in six

months if the king had left him alone," says an ERE politician who has served in several governments in the past twenty years. "He was being undermined by members of his own party and his failures were beginning to catch up with him. But by dismissing him, the king made him a hero."

If Mitsotakis had counted on eighty deputies for a government to replace Papandreou, events were to show that he had seriously miscalculated. Many deputies were intimidated by the immediate pro-Papandreou popular reaction, and refused to defect. The Communist-front EDA party, which had been preparing to attack Papandreou before the crisis, now took the lead in organizing demonstrations in his support. Every evening, the city resounded with the rhythmic cadence: "Pa-pan-dre-ou." When a student was killed during a clash with the police, the left seized the opportunity of staging a dramatic public funeral. Hundreds of mourners marched with upraised fists behind the grieving mother and sister of the victim.

In the meantime, the Mitsotakis group, already stigmatized as the *Apostates*, jockeyed to put together a parliamentary majority. The first politician entrusted with this thankless task was the elderly speaker of the house, Ioannis Athanassiades-Novas. After an undistinguished but dignified political career, Novas found himself in a parliament where chairs were thrown in the course of debate.

The Novas government lasted a matter of days until it was overthrown by a vote of no confidence. The next patchwork coalition lasted a matter of weeks. Meanwhile, the crowds in the streets demanded that the king observe the constitution and appoint a caretaker government to prepare for elections. But the king refused to call for elections, which would have amounted to a referendum on the monarch and which he was sure to lose. Instead, he played for time, drawing one prime minister after another from the ranks of the *Apostates*.

In opposition, the role he loved best,

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Papandreou showed his great talent as a campaigner. A consummate orator, he stumped the countryside, asking, "Who rules Greece? The king or the people?" Massive crowds roared the answer. At the same time, his son went even further, broadening the attack to include what he called the "ruling establishment," composed not only of the palace, but the armed forces and the American embassy as well. Despite the Papandreous' popularity, Andreas' suggestions that Greece review the relationship with the Atlantic Alliance invited the charge of Communist sympathies and aroused deep anxieties. The charge was not altogether mitigated by the fact that the Communists bitterly attacked him as a paid American agent whose aim was to draw away their votes.

For almost two years, the deadlock continued. Instability dried up foreign investments, and in all respects the country was at a standstill, paralyzed by unrest, insecurity and general disgust. In mid-April, 1967, when Panayiotis Kannelopoulos, ERE leader and head of the fourth coalition, announced that it was impossible to postpone elections any longer, Athens already abounded with rumors of an impending coup. Everyone believed that generals close to the palace, eager to save Constantine from the humiliation of a Papandreou victory, would intervene. But whether or not such a plan in fact existed, on the morning of April 21, a triumvirate of colonels stole the march.

The officers who staged the coup numbered about three hundred out of approximately ten thousand in the Greek army, and the tanks surrounding government buildings and power installations numbered thirty-eight. For the colonels it was a bold gamble, and they were well aware of the risk if they failed. A close friend of the family of Stylianos Patakos told us that, on the night of the coup, he gave his strong-willed older daughter a pistol and told her that if he did not get word to her by three o'clock the following morning, she was to shoot her mother and her younger sister and then take her own life.

But the colonels succeeded with incredible ease. Officers not in on the plot followed their orders, because they thought they were coming from the generals, and by implication from the king. For a while no one knew who had taken over the country. So deeply rooted is the fear of Communism in the Greek mind, that many people thought it was the Communists. In the space of several hours, six to seven thousand Greek citizens were arrested. George Papandreou and Panayiotis Kannelopoulos were confined to house arrest; Andreas Papandreou was taken to prison. At the same time, boats began to leave for the island concentration camps with suspected Communists and other leftists.

It is tantalizing to imagine what would have happened if the king had made some gesture of protest, or if some prestigious group such as the ambassadors had resigned in a bloc. One year later, the Czechoslovakian experience offered some suggestions as to how passive resistance can delay a takeover, and in the Greek case the element of time might have been decisive. But the king said nothing, even though the colonels had signed his name to their first governmental decree. Meanwhile, in all walks of life, Greeks resumed their daily affairs. For many of them, after almost two years of the most extreme political haggling and maneuvering, the coup actually came as a relief. The colonels had no trouble finding the words for their first message to the public:

We have long witnessed a crime which had been committed against our society and nation. The unhesitant and shameful party dealing, the misconduct of a great part of the press, the methodical assault against all institutions, their corrosion, the debasement of Parliament, the slandering of everything, the paralyzing of the state machinery, the complete lack of understanding for the burning problems of our youth, the ill-treatment of our students, the moral decline, the confusion and the blurring, the secret and open cooperation with subversives, and finally, the continuous incendiary slogans of unscrupulous demagogues have destroyed the peace of the country, have created a climate of anarchy and chaos, have cultivated conditions of hatred and division and have

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led us to the brink of national disaster. There was no other way of salvation left than the intervention of our Army . . .

The colonels said they had come to save the country from the Communists, but it soon became clear that they had come to save it from many other people as well. Through the summer and the autumn, they began to dismiss hundreds of royalist officers. The colonels themselves were all from poor villages, and had never been favorably treated by the upper-middle-class military establishment. (Patakos, for example, had languished for ten long years as a lieutenant colonel.) So they took their first opportunity to settle some old scores and put their own men in key posts.

By the end of 1967, the extent of the military purges alarmed King Constantine enough to move him to action. On December 13, King Constantine launched his famous counter-coup, departing in a plane for northern Greece, accompanied by his queen, their child, and his mother Fredrika.

"The time has come for you to hear the voice of your monarch," he said, but the recording of his message was broadcast on a weak radio in Larisa and not many of his subjects heard their monarch's voice. In Kavalla, where the king spent the afternoon, huge crowds demonstrated their solidarity, even though this capital of the tobacco country is traditionally leftist in orientation. The king's plan was to send a column from there to occupy Salonika, to establish this Macedonian city as a secessionist capital, just as Eleftherios Venizelos had in his dispute with Constantine's grandfather in 1917.

But he was having trouble getting the powerful army divisions in the area to come to his support. There were still many generals loyal to him, but by the time he decided to act, the colonels had put their own men in key posts and they were able to intercept the general's orders before they reached the commanders in the field. One general caught two of his subordinates countermanding his orders and had them arrested. But they persuaded him that they were really working

for the king after all, and he let them go. A few minutes later, they returned and placed the general under arrest.

"Constantine should have gone to Crete," says an American military attaché. "His strongest support has always been the navy and the air force, both of which have extensive installations in Crete. With the support of the navy and the air force, which the colonels had not got around to purging yet, he would have quickly taken control of the island. Crete would have given him an unassailable base and divided Greece. The colonels would have had to bow to him or risk civil war, the very thing they said they had come to prevent. Washington would not have been able to tolerate the situation and would have used its influence against the colonels."

The Greek political world was put into a deepfreeze when the colonels took over on the morning of April 21, and if it were to be taken out tomorrow, it would emerge more or less in the same form. Except for George Papandreou who died in October, 1968 (leaving the party without a leader) the dominant personalities are the same, and the junta has not been able to make any inroads into their opposition. With the exception of the present foreign minister Panayiotis Pipinellis, an extreme Royalist and frequent advocate of dictatorship in the past, no former politician has agreed to join a junta cabinet, occasional rumors that some would do so are probably only encouraged by the junta because it looks good to have someone talking about future political developments. In reality, a deadlock continues: the politicians have the experience to run the country, the colonels have the country to run.

Any list of the political opposition must include the king, a fact that says more about the traditional powers of the Greek monarchy than it does about this particular monarch. There are occasional suggestions that Constantine should appoint a government-in-exile to induce diplomatic pressure by its sheer nuisance value.

"The king is playing his last cards," Mrs. Helen Vlachos says. "The junta will soon set a date for a referendum on the monarchy which the king would lose now even if it were free."

But even Mrs. Vlachos concedes that the king is not likely to take the offensive. Like most kings, he faces the problem of being surrounded by courtiers who attempt to shelter him from advice that is likely "to upset him." Their own advice to him is that any overt act of opposition on his part will hasten the day of the dreaded referendum, and his best chance of survival is to assume a passive stance. One of them said he believed that "Constantine is gaining in popularity because he is not doing anything, and only lives on as a suffering symbol."

The Athens politicians have not done anything either, although they have a weaker claim to symbolic suffering, and, except for a few on the left and center-left who are in prison or exile, most of them cannot claim to be suffering at all. They go to their offices regularly, stay up to date on the latest Athenian rumors, and generally behave as though something were about to happen. They are not unwilling to dwell on the junta's weaknesses or to castigate the United States for not overthrowing it, but in two and a half years they have not launched a single offensive against it on their own.

Instead they have allowed the initiative to pass almost entirely to the politicians in exile abroad, who naturally have greater difficulty remaining in touch with the political realities within the country. These include Constantine Karamanlis, Andreas Papandreou, Constantine Mitsotakis, the former finance minister who broke with the Papandreous' in 1965, and George Mylonas, former Center Union minister of education.

Prime minister of Greece for eight consecutive years (a record in twentieth-century history), Karamanlis has lived in Paris ever since he gave up the leadership of his party before the elections of 1963. Almost as soon as there was a junta to overthrow, he was mentioned as the man to head a successor government, and

in this capacity he has important qualifications: 1) during his eight years as prime minister, he made a reputation for strong authoritarian rule; 2) having lived in exile for the last six years, he is not compromised by the events leading to the junta; 3) there is no one else.

Karamanlis does not give interviews but, in an informal conversation with a visitor to his apartment in the fashionable Montmorency section of Paris, Karamanlis viewed the recent events philosophically and with a touch of "I told you so."

It is unfortunate what has happened in Greece [he said]. But I warned them in 1963 that they would be voting for chaos if they voted for the demagogues who opposed me. Greeks have always had a built-in destructive sense and whenever they start to move forward, they always do something to ruin it. Whenever someone comes along and tries to show them which way to go, they listen for a while and then they turn on him and try to destroy him. You see that throughout Greek history—Aristides, Themistocles, Pericles, Kolokotronis, Venizelos. The Greek people are a smart people but a difficult people to talk sense to. There comes a time when they will seek out the most foolish voices in a crowd and listen only to them.

Karamanlis is still a massive presence at sixty-one, although now he seems a little pale, and the gray in his hair is closer to white. He regards the colonels as insolent amateurs, but he is under no illusions about what will be required to overthrow them. He said:

These colonels know nothing about governing a country. You would think that a military regime would be cautious economically. But the colonels are more foolish than even the demagogues who followed me. They have taken a whole series of short-term loans, three to five years, to pay for grandiose projects that are not going to return an income for ten to fifteen years. What kind of regime would do a thing like that? A reckless regime. A foolish regime. But only the United States can change the situation in Greece. Until Washington decides to act, nobody else can do anything. You cannot fight a man with your fists when he has daggers in his hands. Someone stronger has to come along and take the daggers away from him first.

Should Washington decide to take action against the junta, Karamanlis has indicated that he is willing to supervise the country's return to democracy. In doing so, he has insisted he would not be acting as the leader of the conservative ERE party, but as a national figure, in the words of one confidant, "as a sort of referee, almost above politics."

Other politicians have tried to determine what is meant by a "referee, almost above politics." In particular, they have tried to get Karamanlis to commit himself on the question of what constitution would apply during the hypothetical transition period. If it were the 1968 Constitution with its authoritarian powers passed by the junta under martial law, many of them feel a new dictatorship would be in the making, this one under Karamanlis.

While such fears may seem farfetched, they have been encouraged by the fact that Karamanlis has done little to clarify his views, and has steadfastly refused to sign any sort of written agreement. In September, 1969, however, he made his long-awaited public statement, calling on the junta to retire or to be overthrown, and inviting the Greek army to overthrow it, if necessary.

"If . . . those who govern at present . . . fail to appreciate their duty [to resign]," he said, "it will have to be pointed out to them by those who joined them in good faith." At the same time, he was at pains to reassure anyone in Washington that the junta could be overthrown, if not without violence, at least without threatening Greece's membership in the NATO alliance.

I must take the opportunity also of assuring those who are anxious about the future that I would not have broken my silence if I did not believe that the country can be restored without danger to conditions of normalcy, and if I were not prepared to make my contribution if need be toward that end.

Despite this statement, Karamanlis has frustrated even his staunchest supporters, many of whom have hoped that he would use his immense influence among the

foreign-based Greek capitalists to raise badly needed money for the opposition. So far he has not been willing to do so. At the very least, they hoped he would add his voice to those of the other exiled politicians lobbying for Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe. But when the Council invited Karamanlis to testify before its Political Committee in Paris (along with Mitsotakis, Mylonas and Papandreou), he declined on the ground that he had already said all he had to say.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, Andreas Papandreou is a complete antithesis to Karamanlis. He loses no opportunity to make a public appearance, and outlines his prescriptions for the future in great detail. Not only is he making no effort to woo United States support, but his campaign seems predicated on the belief that such support is not forthcoming. In fact he may have good reason to believe that it is out of the question for him.

"I think Andreas Papandreou is a major obstacle to the restoration of democracy in Greece," said one official at the American embassy in Athens, who at the same time is highly critical of the junta. "The smartest thing the colonels did was to let him leave the country. Now they can use him as a bogey man. They can point to him and his statements and say 'That is what we saved you from.'"

This view is shared by some members of Papandreou's own party, and one of them in Athens told us in all seriousness that he thought Papandreou's staff was riddled with junta spies who are advising him to do and say just those things that will help the junta.

We visited Papandreou not long ago and asked him what he proposed as an alternative solution if the junta could be overthrown.

This dictatorship can fall in any number of ways [he said] so that what one proposes depends a great deal on how one foresees its demise. Now I have two hats, and I'd be glad to make this clear for you. One hat is my resistance capacity, so to speak. I am in charge of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, one of the organizations engaged in resistance

against the regime. We of PAK have put out a statement on how the next few steps in case the resistance forces occupy the seat of power. . .

Papandreou lit a cigarette and blew the smoke toward the ceiling.

But this is not really what you are asking me [he said]. Rather you are asking if there is a political solution short of a takeover by the people. Naturally a possibility for this exists in principle . . . in principle. It can happen by a decision on the part of the sponsors of the regime, which means the Pentagon, that this thing is not working out, and in that case they would change the signals to the Greek military. Now in this case, I shall not speak anymore with the hat of the resistance movement but with the hat of the Center Union party of which I am the spokesman abroad. So far as the party is concerned, my stand is the following: there should be a get-together of the Greek parties elected in the last free elections in 1964, with one exception—the Progressive party of Mr. Markezinis which has been collaborating with the junta and has therefore become unacceptable to us. These parties should attempt to draw up a magna carta for the transitional government. For this purpose, I am prepared to sit around a table with the right and with the left. By left I do not mean the Communist party which was not elected, but the EDA party which was elected and represents a proportion of the Greek voters, a small one to be sure.

We asked Papandreou if he would support Karamanlis as prime minister of the interim government.

If both the left and the right were agreed [he said] and if at the same time the program were acceptable. I would not consider any solution that is based on the concept of a führer, no matter who he is, even if it happens to be me, which is not at all likely. If the representatives of these parties choose someone to be prime minister—I don't care who—I will accept him on the provision that he commit himself to following the program—the magna carta—which has been jointly approved. I do not accept the procedure of finding a man first and saying, "In you we trust, do what you can to get us out of this mess."

Papandreou supported Karamanlis' recent statement with the reservation that the policies of any interim government must express "the joint platform of the political parties and the resistance organi-

zations." These include the Communist-dominated EDA party and its resistance counterpart, the Patriotic Front, whose cooperation Papandreou knows is unacceptable not only to Karamanlis and the ERE but to most of the Center Union as well. ("I don't know what Andreas can be thinking," says George Mavros of the Center Union in Athens. "We have had to apologize for his leftist affiliations before, and now we have to apologize for them again.")

Papandreou must have known that Karamanlis could not accept Communist cooperation and hope to win the support of the staunchly anti-Communist Greek officer corps, nor for that matter the United States. But if he had had any doubts as to Karamanlis' reaction to his proposal, he had learned the answer exactly one year before.

In September, 1968, Papandreou made his only attempt to communicate with Karamanlis since before the coup. It was not by telephone or even by letter, but by a telegram that Papandreou simultaneously made available to the press in which he invited Karamanlis to sit down with him and Antonios Brillakiss of the EDA party to work out a joint program authorizing an interim prime minister to lead the country to democratic rule.

Even on strictly logical grounds, it is hard to see why a leader of the EDA party, which won twelve percent of the vote in the last Greek election in 1964, should have an equal vote in working out a joint program with the ERE party, which won thirty-five percent of the vote, or with Papandreou's own Center Union which won fifty-three percent. But the thought of Karamanlis sitting down at such a table is so inconceivable that it is difficult to believe that Papandreou was serious. Karamanlis' reply was terse and negative (Papandreou says he is not at liberty to disclose it), and the two men have not communicated since. One year later, in September, 1969, when Papandreou hailed Karamanlis' declaration with the same condition, he was simply repeating a proposal that he knew beforehand would be rejected.

Papandreou told us that his position was inspired by political logic.

No matter what we do in the transition period, it will be the most difficult thing in the world to take this wreck of a society and turn it into a viable and free country. He who stays outside will have the great benefit of free criticism. In the elections afterward, the left will pick up thirty to thirty-five percent, the Center will pick up twenty-five percent. We will be the third party, not even second. My political acumen, such as it is—and I think I have a good sense for events—convinces me that this is the case. I do it as a matter of principle, but I do it also in the interests of Greece.

He may also be doing it because his personal influence would be greatly reduced if he were to be absorbed into a coalition supporting Karamanlis. If the Karamanlis solution were brought about in spite of his objections, he would probably want to remain outside, to have what he calls the benefit of free criticism, and to lay claim to the thirty to thirty-five percent leftist vote in the next election. For good measure, he stipulates that in order to lead the interim government, Karamanlis should disqualify himself from running in the next election.

"If I were in his role, I would not hesitate to accept this restriction," he said. "I will not be and I do not ask to be, but if I were, I would not hesitate."

We asked Papandreou if he would be willing to participate in a transitional government.

"Personally, I would not wish to," he said. "If I can possibly avoid it, I will. The more freedom I can have in such a period, the more I would like it."

Of course, the success of Papandreou's strategy depends on the next election being held at all. Papandreou admits he is looking to the distant future when the resistance organizations overthrow the junta, and despite the fact that he will spend that time in exile, he is confident that he will be able to keep the resistance movement under his control. In the meantime, he has outlined a detailed contingency plan.

In case the resistance forces occupy the seat of power [he says], we are committed to a

transition period of one year, during which neither the 1968 nor the 1952 Constitutions would be in effect, but instead we would employ the United Nations Bill of Human Rights as a guide. We would call for free genuine elections by the end of the first year. All parties—none excluded—would run for office . . . and the first parliament would be a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. In the meantime, on the basis of the law which existed in April 1967, we would try the junta on two counts, one on treason and high treason which under Greek law carries a maximum sentence of twenty years, and secondly on the basis of a common criminal law because all actions they have taken are considered by us to be illegal and shall be studied nakedly by the courts so that torture, imprisonment, and so forth, would be treated as common crimes.

Whatever his critics may say about him, Papandreou takes clearly defined positions on all issues, from the king, whose return he would make subject to a referendum, to Aristotle Onassis, whom he would banish from the land without appeal. His uncompromising attitude has probably alienated many people whose support he would need to carry out a program, but at the same time it has projected him among people in Greece as a symbol of the resistance, which is particularly vivid because it fills a void created by the absence of vigorous leadership. Here, many people believe Karamanlis is partly responsible. Karamanlis' own supporters believe Papandreou can say so much mainly because Karamanlis says so little himself.

"If we have free elections in Greece," says Constantine Mitsotakis, "I think there will be three parties: Karamanlis, Andreas, and the EDA. The rest of the Center will have to make its choice."

Mitsotakis' choice is facilitated by the fact that he made it in 1965, when he broke with the Papandreous. He now maintains that in doing so he was attempting to avert the confrontation that led eventually to the coup, but he does not conceal the fact that he is carrying a heavy burden of shame for his past machinations. With pungent irony, he observes in effect that what he did was worse than a crime: it was a mistake. And perhaps since he

reorganization of government machinery, the "cleansing of social institutions," and economic, social and political reforms.

The colonels may find, however, that they cannot run things on their own and have to invite broader participation in the government. "The colonels are not men of great intelligence and they have no experience or talent for government," says a representative of an international agency, who has had dealings with them. "Papadopoulos is intelligent, quite intelligent. But the others are not. And Papadopoulos has little imagination. His views are very narrow." The most conspicuous failure of the junta has been its inability to attract talented and experienced men to serve in the government. It cannot hope to achieve most of its ambitious goals with the men serving it now. "Most of the men running ministries are unbelievably incompetent," says a German businessman with extensive interests in Greece. Premier Papadopoulos has found it so difficult to get competent men that he has held as many as five ministries at one time himself. The situation is certain to get worse because military men now in secondary positions in the government are pressing for top jobs, and they are even less experienced than the civilians in the government.

The junta has had its most difficult time handling the economy. In the seven years before the coup the gross national product grew between seven and eight percent annually, but the first year the colonels were in power the increase dropped to less than half the rate. The colonels attributed the decline to the crisis in the Middle East in the summer of 1967 and other factors beyond their control. In 1968 they launched a five-year development program with a growth target of eight percent. Last year, the first year of the plan, the growth rate was only four and a half percent, according to the junta's figures, or less than three percent, according to American economic analysts.

To make up for the decline, the colonels have gone in for big dramatic projects. In 1967 they contracted with Litton Industries, the United States conglomerate,

to have the company promote \$840 million in foreign investments for Greece in the next twelve years. Fifty million of that was supposed to come the first two years, but the deadline passed in May last year and only two projects, worth less than \$1 million, had reached the groundbreaking stage. Finally, both Litton and the junta gave up a few months ago and cancelled their agreement. The junta has also tried to persuade some of the more famous Greek industrialists to get involved in the economy of Greece, including Aristotle Onassis, Stavros Niarchos and Thomas A. Pappas.

Pappas came to Greece in 1961 and won the concession for an oil refinery in Salonika. He has been a controversial figure in Greece ever since, particularly after he told a Greek journalist that he had done some work for the Central Intelligence Agency on occasion while living in the country. It has been reported that he is close to the junta, which is supposed to admire his contacts with the Administration in Washington, but the enchantment between them is fading. In an interview in his office early last year, carefully supervised by public relations men, Pappas said the present regime is doing fine and his relations with it are excellent. But we ran into him a few months later at the Astir Palace Hotel overlooking a beautiful cove about fifteen miles from Athens, and he appeared much less pleased with the colonels. He was waiting for guests—relatives of the late President Eisenhower—to join him for dinner. We asked him how his plans for developing a meat industry in Greece were going. "I'm not optimistic about anything with these people," he said. "They just don't know how to act in a business way. But you know their biggest problem? They don't trust anybody. They keep stalling and shifting and stalling, and you never know what to expect from them. How can you deal with people like that?"

In 1969, Greece had its best year economically since the coup. The junta says the country's economy grew eight and a half percent during the year. Independent economists say the increase was around six

without. Although most Greeks are still hopeful that change can come peacefully, a few have turned to drastic methods. During the past months bombs have been exploding throughout Athens with increasing regularity. Last July alone, opponents of the junta set off ten bombs. The Athens Hilton, the Bank of Greece, the foreign press and information office and numerous American cars, including one belonging to a U. S. Army attaché, have been hit by bombs. Some of the blasts are thought to be the work of the right-wing National Resistance Movement (KEA), and American property seems to be one of the primary targets. "You have become more hateful than the Athens regime," a leaflet addressed to Americans from the KEA declared. "You will be responsible for the civil war that will follow." The leaflet was signed by "General Akritas," the mysterious leader of the movement. (The name comes from Dighenis Akritas, a Byzantine hero. General Grivas used the first part, Dighenis, as his code name while leading the fight against British rule in Cyprus during the 1950s.) In its leaflets the group says it wants Constantine Karamanlis to be brought back to restore parliamentary government in Greece.

In addition to the KEA, there are more than two dozen other resistance groups operating throughout Greece, including one called the Patriotic Front, which is directed by Communists. The strongest groups belong to the right and center, the left being weak and disorganized at the moment. The bombs that have exploded thus far have been timed to go off at night to avoid hitting people, although about half a dozen people have been injured as a result of the blasts. "You can tell the Communists are not behind the blasts," says a Greek journalist. "If they were, the bombs would have been set up to kill." The most seriously injured victim was apparently a member of a resistance

group. Dionysos Karageorgas, a professor at the Pantios School of Political Sciences in Athens, was trying to fix the detonator on one of thirteen bombs in the basement of his house, according to Athens police, when it went off. As a result of injuries from the blast, he lost his right arm and the sight of his left eye. Karageorgas, who served in the Center of Economic Research, was among the professors who were dismissed when the junta seized power, but he was later reinstated. In April he was sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted of sedition by a military court. Twenty-six other Greeks tried with him received long prison terms.

All the resistance groups have a long way to go before they are strong enough to threaten the regime, but many of them seem determined to try, particularly the right-wing groups that include former army officers with training and experience as fighters. The right-wing establishment is strongly opposed to the junta because it lost the most power and influence with the arrival of the nonestablishment colonels. The left has been out of power since the civil war. Although it is quite weak now, the left commands considerable support among students and certain groups of workers and can call on them when it decides to move.

The right and the center may be behind much of the little resistance there is now to the junta [says a former minister in the Karamanlis government], but you can be sure that as it builds up, the left will get into it in full force. It did not take much for the Communists to seize control of the resistance movement during the occupation. I don't think there is ever going to be another civil war in Greece. I think Greeks learned their lesson the last time. But if things don't change, we're going to have a lot of violence in Greece, a lot of senseless killing and a lot of destruction. I don't say that as Andreas Papandreou says it—as a threat. I say it because I am afraid of what is going to happen here.

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